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The eﬀects of learning in interactive monetary
policy committees
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Abstract
We develop a theoretical framework for studying the eﬀects of in-
teraction on the quality of decision-making by monetary policy com-
mittees. We show that interaction, ie increasing one’s expertise through
an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent
voting behaviour. Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we
find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.
Jel Codes: E52, E58, D83, D71
Key Words: Monetary policy, interest rates, learning
1 Introduction
The primary goal of this paper is to explore the economic implications of
a simple decision theoretic approach to group decision making. Compared
to classical social theoretic approaches (see, for example, Arrow, 1963; Sen,
1970, 1977), in which collective action is based on diverse preferences of the
individuals in the group, our starting point is the premise that group deci-
sion making should be based on common preferences of the decision makers
and on their decisional competence. Moreover, we restrict our analysis to di-
chotomous choice situations. That is, we assume that individual members of
a group share a common interest, they are all involved in the same single task
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(in which they face the same binary set of possible actions), but they might
possess diﬀerent decisional skills. The latter diversity may partly reflect the
diﬀerent signals or information available to the individuals concerned. How-
ever, it is also possible that, although sharing identical information, they will
make diﬀerent choices due to the diversity in their talents to absorb, process
and translate the information into the desirable decision. Consider for ex-
ample a group of central bankers, comprising a monetary policy committee
(MPC). Despite being exposed to the same information regarding the state
of the economy, members might reach diﬀerent conclusions regarding the ap-
propriate interest rate due to their personal interpretation of the information
and the heterogeneity of their capabilities. Assuming that members share the
same goal, i.e. achieve a certain objective of monetary policy (price stability,
for example), does not seem overly restrictive. The decision to be taken by
a MPC can be naturally interpreted as being binary, i.e. whether to change
interest rates or not. The direction of a change seems far less controversial,
as it usually can be inferred by the recent history of the economy.
Our framework allows us to provide insights into the resolution of numer-
ous realistic issues. Prominent among those features monetary policy making
by a committee. A MPC can be interpreted as an organization which pro-
duces as its main output a decision on interest rates. This collective decision
is the result of a complex combination of inputs such as the number and
quality of members, and the time required for decision making. We are in
particular interested in the impact of the ‘technology’ relating the inputs
to the output. In this paper, we will focus on three crucial aspects of this
technology: interdependence among individual members due to learning, in-
formational asymmetries between members and the formation of coalitions
within the MPC.
This focus is motivated by casual empirical observation. Some well-known
central banks organize their monetary policy decision making through com-
mittees.1 As noted by others (Goodfriend, 1999; De Nederlandsche Bank,
2000), an important characteristic of MPC’s is that members communicate
with each other, convince each other and may learn from each other. More-
over, two of the most influential central banks, the US Federal Reserve and
the European System of Central Banks, have a structure characterized by a
main oﬃce in a central location (the ‘hub’) with additional regional oﬃces
throughout the currency area (the ‘spokes’). MPC members from the hub
(for example the Board of Governors in the US or the ECB Executive Board
in Europe) have relatively more intensive contacts among each other than
1As noted by, inter alia, Blinder (1998), this could have implications for the conduct
of policy.
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the members from the spokes. This is due to the fact that the former are
geographically concentrated (i.e. located in the same building) and that they
have to meet regularly anyway to decide on other issues. It is not diﬃcult
to imagine that during these meetings, they ‘pre-empt’ on interest rate dis-
cussions forthcoming in the MPC, implying an informal prior board meeting
which might lead to a coalition, in the form of a common prior position on
interest rates, within the MPC. Finally, both in the US and in Europe, the
hub is entrusted with the preparation of the MPC meetings, which might
give them an informational advantage, implying informational asymmetries.
We show that this technology of a MPC has important consequences for
the quality of its decisions, even if committee members share a common goal.
We consider relaxing the assumption of preference diﬀerences an important
addition to the existing literature (see, for example, von Hagen and Su¨ppel,
1994; Hefeker, 2003; Sibert, 2003). A second contribution stems from the
fact that we do not impose a priori that interaction implies interdependent
voting (Nitzan and Paroush, 1985; Ladha, 1992; Ladha, 1995) but instead
determine the conditions under which interdependent voting emerges. A
final contribution stems from the introduction of time into group decision
making, which makes transparent the trade-oﬀ between the optimal size of
the committee and the optimal amount of time it requires to take a collective
decision.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start, in section two, by
describing the eﬀects of time on the expertise of committee members, i.e.
the learning process, followed by specifying several decision-making processes
of interest (section three). In section four we turn to an investigation of
the quality of decision-making under several decision-making scenarios and
committee members’ characteristics. Section five discusses the optimal size
and decision time of the committee. Section six concludes.
To preview our findings, we show that the well-known result that inter-
action is detrimental to the collective outcome (due to an ineﬃcient use of
information) requires very restrictive and unrealistic assumptions. In a less
restrictive setting, which we consider more realistic, members increase their
expertise through an exchange of views in the committee meeting, but base
their vote on their own opinion. This will improve the collective outcome.
Moreover, a committee designer faces a certain degree of flexibility between
committee size and the amount of time available to reach a collective deci-
sion, depending on the magnitude of costs involved. A smaller MPC may do
as well as a larger one, provided that it will receive more time for reaching a
decision.
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2 Learning
Assume an economy which can be in either of two states of the world: eco-
nomic conditions are such that a change in policy rates is required (state
a) or not (state b). MPC members i = 1, . . . , n have to assess the unob-
servable state using available information. Assume that the ability to assess
the state of the economy correctly is specific for each individual: the proba-
bility that an individual takes the correct decision based on his knowledge2
diﬀers among committee members: Pi(vote A|a) = Pi(vote B|b) = qi and
consequently Pi(vote B|a) = Pi(vote A|b) = 1 − qi.3 The diﬀerences in in-
dividual abilities are not unbounded, however, as expertise is an important
selection criterion for committee membership. The Maastricht Treaty is a
case in point as it requires (in Article 11) ECB Board members to be en-
dowed with ”professional experience in monetary or banking matters”. We
formalize this legal requirement by assuming that individual inherent skills
qi represent independent draws from a single distribution with mean q.
A key characteristic of committee decision-making (Goodfriend, 1999) is
that it involves an (informative) exchange of views regarding the current
state of the economy, as well as its likely future development (over a horizon
relevant to the monetary transmission mechanism). These discussions allow
committee members to expand their private knowledge, gain new insights,
get new ideas, or improve their expertise in any other way. We label this
process as ’learning’.4 Following experimental evidence (Lombardelli et al,
2002) we assume that learning can be captured by two eﬀects:
1. catching-up: less-skilled committee members update their knowledge
learning from their more-skilled colleagues. Members’ skills should
therefore converge, although not necessarily perfectly. This is because
sharing expertise requires time, which in our case is scarce. As a mat-
ter of fact, we assume that the total amount of time available to the
committee to reach a collective decision is fixed.5 As a result individ-
2I.e. the probability of supporting a change in interest rates (decision A) in state a and
opposing it (i.e. voting for decision B) in state b.
3We assume that individual expertise qi ranges between 0.5 and qi for all i = 1, ..., n,
where qi is the upper limit on individual skills (qi ≤ 1). For a discussion of the assumption
of qi > 0.5, see Ladha (1992). Note that this assumption implies that each member receives
enough but incomplete information about the true state of the economy. If qi ≤ 0.5, the
decision could be taken by tossing a coin.
4Note that learning presupposes interaction; without interaction each committee mem-
ber decides based only on his own views.
5This assumption is easily justified, as the duration of both the meetings of the FOMC
of the FED and the Governing Council of the ECB is pre-announced.
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ual learned skills (denoted as eqi) may still diﬀer when the committee
decides on interest rates.
2. knowledge creation: learning is not limited to members with relatively
low skills, as during discussions more-skilled committee members may
get new insights or ideas and therefore increase their expertise.6
Both eﬀects are captured analytically by the functional form:7
eqi = qi − (qi − qi) exp (−λiT ) (1)
where T denotes total time available to the committee to take the collec-
tive decision8, qi is the (exogenous) upper limit on individual skills and λ
determines the rate of learning (i.e. the slope of the learning curve at time
T ).9 As to the latter, we will focus on the eﬀects of committee characteristics
(’technology’) on the learning process, and assume that the rate of learning
is positively related to the relative number of more-skilled group members:
λi = λi (ω) ,λ
0
i > 0 (2)
where ω is the share of more-skilled members in the group, 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1.10
The abovementioned learning eﬀects imply that there are two learning
curves, since the upper limit on learned skills is diﬀerent for the more- and
less-skilled committee members. Knowledge creation implies that with time
the expertise of the more-skilled members approaches an exogenously deter-
mined upper limit of individual accuracy:11
eqi,i∈MS = 0.9− (0.9− qi) exp (−λiT ) (3)
6Naturally, if the skills are a priori homogeneous, only the second eﬀect occurs.
7See e.g. Goldstein et al. (1993).
8If T = 0 there is no interaction (and learning): the committee assembles and members
immediately and simultaneously take a vote on interest rates.
9λi governs the speed of reducing the competence gap (qi − eqi): ∂(qi−eqi)∂T = −∂eqi∂T =
−λi (qi − eqi) ≤ 0. Therefore if λi is large, the learning curve is concave, since the initial
reduction in the competence gap is large. If λi is small, the reduction in the competence
gap becomes more gradual, and the learning curve is approximately linear. As a result,
λi also eﬀects the final competence gap: the larger λi, the higher the final competence:
∂eqi
∂λi = T (qi − qi) exp (−λiT ) ≥ 0.
10Further in the analysis we will assume the simplest functional form for lambda: λi = ω.
11In theory, the maximum limit on any probability is 1, but we will more modestly
assume that the capacity of any individual to judge the state of the world correctly is
90%.
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whereMS ⊂ N is the subset of more-skilled committee members. Catching-
up means that the expertise of the less-skilled individual approaches the
expertise of the more skilled members:
eqi,i∈LS = eqi,i∈MS − (eqi,i∈MS − qi) exp (−λiT ) (4)
where LS ⊂ N is the subset of less-skilled committee members.
It is useful to elaborate somewhat on the economics behind our assumed
learning process. Note that we identify heterogenous skills eqi, without hav-
ing to specify the sources of this heterogeneity. The latter may for example
result from diﬀerent models used regarding the functioning of the economy.
Alternatively, committee members use identical models but confront them
with diﬀerent data sets. In the latter case, members will be able to derive
identical solution paths describing the evolution of the relevant variables.
These are of course functions of the structural parameters of the economy.
Estimates of these parameters might diﬀer among members, and due to in-
teraction some members will be able to update their parameter estimates
based on the information provided by other members. What we then have
is a learning process in which committee members update their expectations
(in this case, about the current and projected path of key policy variables)
based on new information, an interpretation that is consistent with the re-
cently mushrooming literature on learning, see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). Note, however, that the generality of our framework also allows for
alternative interpretations.
3 Committee decision-making
The MPC is comprised of members who ex hypothesi share a common goal,
i.e. making the correct interest rate decision, which corresponds to imposing
reputational concerns on committee members. Throughout the analysis, we
consider two cases. In the first, there is only a policy meeting (that is, a
meeting of the MPC). Committee members assemble in order to decide on
interest rates, and, depending on the time available, they discuss their views
or simply take a vote (which is simultaneous). In the second case, a MPC
meeting is preceded by an informal prior board meeting in which m out
of n (exogenously selected) MPC members12 discuss economic conditions.
This informal meeting is then followed by a MPC meeting where the interest
rate decision is taken, with or without interaction, depending on the time
available. This two-stage decision-making process seems especially relevant
12Throughout the analysis we will assume that m is even and n is odd.
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for monetary policy committees in systems of central banks, such as the Fed
or the ESCB. There, one could well envisage that the Board of Governors or
the Executive Board discuss interest rates prior to the meeting of the FOMC
or the Governing Council, respectively (see the introduction).
Besides possible empirical relevance, a two-stage decision-making process
is useful for analyzing the incentives individual members have to follow the
views of others. The latter may (but, as we shall argue later on, need not)
be the result of learning the views of other decision-makers (i.e. interac-
tion).13 More specifically, during the informal prior meeting a subset of the
committee (i.e. the board) may formulate a common position, which can
subsequently be revealed to other members. Non-board committee members
interested in attaining the best possible collective outcome then face a choice
between following their own views and following the common position of the
board.14 Note, however, that the interest rate decision formally has to be
taken by the whole committee. The board thus has an option (which is not
available to the committee) not to take any decision. Our decision rule for
the board reflects this endogenous possibility. The informal prior meeting
of the board generates one out of three outcomes: a common position for a
change in interest rates, a common position against a change or no common
position. Notwithstanding the lack of an optimality result (due to Arrow’s
impossibility theorem), it can be shown (Berk and Bierut, 2003) that this
rule is superior to simple majority (by which the board always assumes a
common position) in terms of quality of decision-making. A second justifi-
cation of our assumed rule for the board lies in its real-life relevance. Meade
and Sheets (forthcoming) document the existence of dissents among members
of the Board in their study of FOMC voting behavior. A priori assuming a
common position in the board thus seems at odds with reality. On the other
hand, given that we want to investigate the eﬀects of a coalition within the
MPC on the quality of the collective decision, we do not want to rule out the
possibility of reaching a common position a priori.
13We therefore do not consider these incentives when the lack of time does not allow
for interaction (i.e. if T = 0). In this respect, our approach diﬀers from the existing
literature, where following the majority view is analysed in a simultaneous voting game
(see e.g. Nitzan and Paroush (1985)).
14In order to introduce a similar choice for board members, we assume that their common
position may be formed not only when they are actually unanimous. We assume that board
members may decide to present a common view on the appropriate interest rates decision
also when a certain majority kb (
m
2 +1 ≤ kb < m) of them supports this decision. In such
a case m2 − 1 board members decide to forego their own opinion.
Assuming that presenting a common position requires unanimity would have two eﬀects:
(1) the strategic choice of board members is ruled out, and (2) the dissents among board
members would be far more frequent.
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The simple diagram below presents the second case.15 Note that the set-
up described above is separate from the issue of learning, which will be taken
up in the next section.
0 -1 
Board meeting 
Learning Learning 
Decision: 
? Consensus 
? No consensus 
1 
Time 
Policy  
decision 
MPC meeting 
The quality of collective decision-making is measured by the conditional prob-
ability that the committee takes the correct decision, i.e. P (B|b) (or, equiv-
alently, P (A|a)). When there only is a policy meeting (the first case above)
this quality can be calculated as:
P (B|b) = P
S⊂N
s≥n+1
2
Q
i∈S
eqi Q
i/∈S
(1− eqi) (5)
The summation runs over all subsets S of committee members, who vote for
the correct decision and whose number s is large enough to pass this decision
by simple majority (i.e. s must be at least n+1
2
).16
The second case is more complicated, as the outcome of the informal
prior board meeting has implications for the number of votes casted by non-
board members necessary to pass the correct decision in the policy meeting:
if the board does not reach consensus, its members will vote individually
on interest rates, ex hypothesi expressing the same opinion as voiced in the
board meeting. In this case all committee members vote individually. As
a result between n+1
2
− (m− kb + 1) and n+12 − (kb − 1) votes of non-board
MPC members are required to pass either decision. Therefore the conditional
probability that the committee adopts the correct decision in this case is given
by:
P1(B|b) =
P
Sb⊂M
m−kb+1
≤sb≤kb−1


Q
i∈Sb
eqi Q
i/∈Sb
(1− eqi) P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
−sb
Q
i∈S
eqi Q
i/∈S
(1− eqi)

 (6)
15We assume that the policy meeting which must result in the interest rate decision
begins at time T = 0 and lasts until T = 1. The scale to the left from point zero measures
the informal prior meeting of board members.
16For a study of alternative voting rules, see Berk and Bierut (2003).
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The sums are taken first over all subsets Sb of board members voting individ-
ually for the correct decision, i.e. such that the number of board members
in Sb (denoted by sb) is between m − kb + 1 and kb − 1, and then over all
subsets S of non-board members, who also vote correctly and whose number
s is large enough to pass this decision by simple majority, i.e. s must be at
least n+1
2
− sb.
Alternatively, if the informal prior board meeting ends in a common po-
sition, obtaining a majority in the policy meeting for the decision supported
by the board obviously requires less votes of other MPC members. More
specifically, it requires only n+1
2
−m out of n−m votes. Obtaining majority
for the other alternative requires n+1
2
out of n −m votes. Therefore, if the
board has adopted a common position favouring the wrong alternative (A),
the conditional probability that the policy meeting ends with the correct
decision is given by:
P2(B|b) =
P
Sb⊂M
sb≥kb
Q
i∈Sb
(1− eqi) Q
i/∈Sb
eqi


P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
Q
i∈S
eqi Q
i/∈S
(1− eqi)

 (7)
Sb now denotes all subsets of board members voting incorrectly, which have
majority in the board and therefore impose consensus for the wrong alter-
native. S denotes all subsets of non-board members voting correctly and
exceeding the required majority n+1
2
.
Similarly, if the board has adopted a common position in favor of the
correct alternative (B):
P3(B|b) =
P
Sb⊂M
sb≥kb
Q
i∈Sb
eqi Q
i/∈Sb
(1− eqi)


P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
−m
Q
i∈S
eqi Q
i/∈S
(1− eqi)

 (8)
Again subsets Sb comprise board members, who vote correctly and have
majority in the board. S denotes subsets of non-board members, whose
number is large enough to obtain the majority in the committee, i.e. such
that s ≥ n+1
2
−m.17
If the common position reached by the board is followed by other MPC
members, the board eﬀectively determines the interest rate. In particular, if
17Obviously, P (B ∩CB|b) is larger than P (B ∩CA|b), since for eqi > 0.5, it is true that:
(1) all committee members are more likely to be right and therefore the board is more
likely to obtain the majority for the correct decision, and (2) in this case the required
number of non-board committee members supporting the correct decision may be smaller
than the simple majority.
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the common position of the board is wrong, it becomes impossible to pass
the correct decision.18
Given these expressions, we are able to calculate the quality of the col-
lective decision taken by the MPC, if the policy meeting is preceded by an
informal prior meeting of the board:19
P (B|b) = P1(B|b) + P2(B|b) + P3(B|b) (9)
The expressions above can be somewhat simplified. Given that the ob-
jective of this paper is to investigate group decision-making, we follow the
literature (see, for example, Owen et al., 1989, and Grofman et al., 1982)
by focusing on (sub)group instead of individual characteristics. A natural
summary statistic in this respect is that of a (sub)group mean competence:
eqMS = 0.9− (0.9− qMS) exp (−λMST ) (10)eqLS = eqMS − (eqMS − qLS) exp (−λLST ) (11)
if skills are inherently asymmetric.20 Otherwise, we can use the committee
mean competence:21
eq = 0.9− (0.9− q) exp (−λT ) (12)
Moreover, note that the above conditional probabilities do not depend on
the actual sequence but on the number of votes. Replacing the individual
skills with the average and summarizing all possible sequences of x out of
n votes casted for the same alternative by binomial coeﬃcients
¡
n
x
¢
we can
subsequently use expected conditional probabilities to assess the quality of
the committee decision-making. To this we now turn.
4 Quality of interest rate decisions
In the set-up described above, the quality of the collective decision of the
MPC, which ex hypothesi is taken by simple majority22, is a function of the
18In this case P2(B|b) = 0 and P3(B|b) =
P
Sb⊂M
sb≥kb
Q
i∈Sb
eqi Q
i/∈Sb
(1− eqi).
19Note that if board members do not vote interdependently, then kb in the above ex-
pressions becomes equal to m. As a result (9) becomes equivalent to (5).
20qMS denotes the average inherent expertise of the more-skilled committee members,
whereas qLS denotes the average for the less-skilled committee members. The learning
rates are given as: λMS = 1 and λLS = ω.
21q is the mean inherent competence of all committee members. The common learning
rate is λ = 1.
22Although realistic, this rule is formally optimal under very restrictive conditions only.
See Berk and Bierut (2003) for a discussion of the eﬀects of diﬀerent voting rules.
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competence of the members. This is related to interaction or learning. If
the MPC meeting is preceded by an informal prior board meeting, and when
members in both meetings interact, the final expertise of MPC members
becomes heterogenous, even if it has been homogeneous initially. Figure 1
below illustrates this, for initially symmetric skills set at q = 0.6, a board
of size 6 and a MPC of 19 members. The policy meeting lasts from time
T = 0 until T = 1. The dashed line to the left represents the skills of
board members, and the dashed line to the right the skills of non-board
members (learning rates λB = 1 and λNB = mn =
6
19
). The single solid line
represents (for completeness) the case of a single MPC meeting only (no prior
board meeting) with all members interacting simultaneously (which implies
a learning rate λB = λNB = 1).
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1T
Figure 1. The learning processes
The graph clearly shows that learning in both the prior board meeting
and the policy meeting makes the board better oﬀ than would be the case
when learning occurred only in the MPC meeting. The reverse holds for
non-board members. This is due to the catching-up eﬀect of learning. When
there is only a single policy meeting, non-board committee members improve
their skills ’catching up’ to the maximum level of 90% accuracy, whereas in
the other case their skills ’catch up’ to the board members’ expertise, which
is below the maximum. Which process leads to a higher collective exper-
tise depends on the composition of the committee, i.e. the shares of board
and non-board members. In any case, interaction improves the expertise of
committee members. Proposition 1 follows directly.
Proposition 1 Interaction among committee members improves the quality
of the collective decision-making process.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
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The proof holds, regardless of an initial skill diﬀerential between board
and other committee members. We illustrate the no-diﬀerential situation in
Figures 2 and 3 below. The graphs depict the eﬀects of interaction on the
probability that the MPC takes the correct decision (denoted as EP ), for two
committee sizes: 19 and 9. In the first committee, the board of 6 members
is in minority, in the second - in majority. The former case may therefore
be interpreted as relevant for the ECB Governing Council and the latter as
relevant for the FOMC. Dotted lines denote the no-interaction (and therefore
no-learning) case (i.e. simple voting on interest rates). Dashed lines refer to
the case in which learning is limited to board members. Solid lines refer to
learning involving all committee members, both simultaneously (i.e. when
there only is a MPC meeting: thin lines) and in two stages (informal prior
board meeting and MPC meeting: medium lines). The lines are drawn as
a function of inherent (homogeneous) average decisional skills q, under the
assumption that the time allotted for taking a decision equals 1 period.
In both committees, the highest quality of the collective decision is at-
tained when all committee members are involved in interaction and learning.
In a small committee, a single policy meeting yields inferior results relative to
an informal board meeting preceding the policy meeting, since in the latter
case the majority of committee members (i.e. the board) interacts twice and
hence has twice as much time to improve their skills. In the large committee,
the quality of the collective decision is best served by allowing only for a
single policy meeting, in which all members learn and improve their skills.
Simply convening and mechanistically voting on interest rates yields by far
the worst results, regardless of committee size.
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
EP
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9q
Figure 2. Eﬀects of learning on the accuracy of the MPC decision
(a large MPC)
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0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
EP
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9q
Figure 3. Eﬀects of learning on the accuracy of the MPC decision
(a small MPC)
The conclusions stated above are in contrast to the conclusions made
earlier in the literature (see, for example, Nitzan and Paroush, 1985, Ladha,
1992, and Ladha, 1995), where interaction is generally found to be detrimen-
tal to the accuracy of collective decision-making. This contrast stems from a
diﬀerent interpretation of interaction. The above-mentioned authors assume
that interaction coincides with interdependent voting, whereas we assume
that interaction coincides with learning and may result in interdependent
voting. We prefer our interpretation, as we think it is important to allow
for the possibility that partners in a discussion (interaction) fail to convince
each other. Indeed, Proposition 2 shows that interdependent voting is not
identical to interaction among committee members, if they are interested in
maximizing the accuracy of the collective decision.
Proposition 2 In interactive committees interdependent voting behavior is
unlikely, provided that the members’ primary interest is in the accuracy of
the collective decision.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
It follows from Appendix 2 that there exist only a limited number of
situations in which interdependent voting may be the optimal strategy; they
require that board members on average possess a significantly higher skill
level and have a learning monopoly (i.e. only the board members are able
to learn). Alternatively, this situation will arise when the committee size
becomes extremely large so that non-board members cannot increase their
skills with learning, whereas the board in its informal prior meeting is able
to learn. Neither condition is likely to be satisfied in real-life. Interest rate
decisions are not taken without discussions among all MPC members and
MPC’s are not extremely large. Furthermore, MPC members are selected
according to their expertise, suggesting relatively high and similar expertise.
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Again we illustrate our conclusions graphically. Figures 4, 5 (both graphs
assume a relatively small MPC not dominated by the board, i.e. n = 19)
and 6 (which replicates figure 5 for a very large committee, i.e. n = 39)
present the eﬀects of interdependent voting behavior on the accuracy of the
collective decision taken by a committee composed of equally skilled mem-
bers.23 Starting from a set-up in which an informal board meeting precedes
the actual policy meeting, learning can occur in the informal meeting only
(figure 4) or in both meetings (figure 5). Dotted lines depict the evolution
of the probability of taking the correct collective decision assuming all mem-
bers base their vote on their own opinion. Dashed lines assume a coalition of
the board (i.e. a common position), and solid lines assume that other MPC
members follow the board (the latter line obviously is not drawn in figure 4).
0.8
0.9
1
EP
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9q
Figure 4. Eﬀects of interdependent voting on the accuracy of
the MPC decision (interaction occurs once)
23I.e. we assume qB = qNB = q. The results under heterogeneous skills are presented
below (figures 7 and 8). All figures assume a board of size 6, and that a majority of 4
suﬃces for a common position in the board (this implies the highest likelihood of consensual
behaviour). Moreover, we assume that the time alloted for discussions equals 1 period,
both for the informal meeting (if it occurs) and for the policy meeting.
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0.94
0.96
0.98
1
EP
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9q
Figure 5. Eﬀects of interdependent voting on the accuracy of
the MPC decision (interaction occurs twice)
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
EP
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9q
Figure 6. Eﬀects of interdependent voting on the accuracy of
the MPC decision (interaction occurs twice, a very large MPC)
Without interaction in the policy meeting, the prior informal meeting of
board members is the only forum for increasing valuable expertise.24 In such
a case taking a common position on interest rates by the board is beneficial
for the quality of the collective outcome since it reinforces the position of
members who have eﬀectively higher expertise and who are therefore more
likely to be correct. The reasoning is similar if interaction takes place both
in the informal meeting and in the policy meeting, but when the committee
size is so large that learning has a negligible eﬀect on the skills of non-board
committee members.
If all committee members can interact and eﬀectively learn, independent
voting delivers the most accurate collective decisions, and therefore should
be the dominant strategy of committee members. This result is intuitive:
improved expertise is too valuable to be wasted.
24This requires of course that time is not scarce.
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These results above carry through to the case of asymmetric inherent
skills, as figures 7 and 8 below illustrate (drawn for n = 19, additional as-
sumptions are: qB = 0.8 and qNB ≤ 0.8 (measured on the X-axis)). Note
that with symmetric skills it took a large committee size to make interde-
pendent voting an optimal strategy (figure 6), whereas a bias in initial skills
reduces the committee size above which interdependent voting dominates in-
dependent voting (in the case when the policy meeting involves interaction).
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
EP
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8q(NB)
Figure 7. Eﬀects of interdependent voting on the accuracy of
the MPC decision (interaction occurs once)
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
EP
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8q(NB)
Figure 8. Eﬀects of interdependent voting on the accuracy of
the MPC decision (interaction occurs twice)
These results lead to some interesting policy interpretations. First, if
one prefers a monetary policy committee in which members learn from each
other and subsequently use the acquired expertise to vote on interest rates,
one should (i) prevent a systematic diﬀerential in skills between the ’hub’
and the ’spokes’, (ii) allow for interaction in the policy meeting (i.e. among
all MPC members), and (iii) keep the committee size limited. In such a
situation, committee members interested in their reputation will not have
incentives to forego their private opinion and follow the majority view.
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5 Optimal committee size
The upshot from the preceding analysis is that interaction is beneficial for
group decision-making. However, discussions take time, and extending the
time allotted to the committee to take a decision is costly. The improve-
ment in the collective outcome thus does not come without a cost. Neither
should we expect that individuals participate in decision-making bodies for
purely altruistic motives. Their participation usually involves paying salaries.
Therefore the total cost is related to the size of the committee as well as the
time it requires to take a decision. Since the quality of the collective decision
also depends on both variables, we can calculate the optimal size and learn-
ing time of a committee, given its structure, average inherent skills (assumed
to be homogeneous) and costs involved.
We capture both types of costs by the following function:
C(n, T ) = αn+ exp(βT )− 1 (13)
where α,β > 0.The former parameter denotes the constant cost per com-
mittee member (see also Gradstein, Nitzan and Paroush, 1990). Time costs
are assumed to be non-linear, which can be motivated by real-life relevance.
The meetings of the FOMC or the ECB Governing Council have a more or
less pre-announced duration. Then, if a meeting exceeds the pre-announced
deadline, economic agents may interpret this as a sign that the decision to be
taken is a contentious one - possibly an indication of a disagreement among
the decision-makers. In other words, financial markets may negatively inter-
pret a longer-then-expected duration of the meeting, and may even question
the quality of the decision taken (thus the credibility of the central bank is
negatively aﬀected). If one assumes that this type of eﬀects is likely to accu-
mulate the longer the meeting lingers on, then the time-related costs should
be modelled in a nonlinear fashion.
We measure the quality of committee decision-making process by the con-
ditional expected probability that the committee takes the correct decision:
Π(n, T ) = EP (B|b) (14)
Based on the previous sections, we characterize the benefit function as fol-
lows:
∂Π(n, T )
∂n
=
∂EP (B|b)
∂n
+
∂EP (B|b)
∂eq ∂eq∂λ ∂λ∂n
=
∂EP (B|b)
∂n
+
∂λ
∂n
T (q − q) exp (−λT ) ∂EP (B|b)
∂eq ≥ 0 (15)
∂Π(n, T )
∂T
=
∂EP (B|b)
∂eq ∂eq∂T = λ (q − q) exp (−λT ) ∂EP (B|b)∂eq ≥ 0 (16)
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These equations show, on the one hand, that increasing the number of com-
mittee members has a non-negative eﬀect on the collective outcome, which
corresponds to the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet, 1785). On the other
hand, as can be seen from equation (2) in section 2, admitting more members
reduces the positive eﬀects of granting the committee more time to discuss
and decide, because the increased committee size reduces the eﬀectiveness of
learning.
The optimal committee size and the learning time then follow from the
first order conditions:
∂Π(n∗, T )
∂n
=
∂C(n∗, T )
∂n
= α (17)
∂Π(n, T ∗)
∂T
=
∂C(n, T ∗)
∂T
= β exp(βT ) (18)
The tables below present the optimal combinations of committee size n∗ and
learning time T ∗ together with the resulting net benefit Π(n∗, T ∗)−C(n∗, T ∗).
The first table presents the results for the set-up in which there only is a
single meeting (i.e. the policy meeting), and a set-up which entails both a
prior informal board meeting and a MPC meeting. Learning in the latter
case is limited to the board meeting.25 The second table presents the results
for the situation of both an informal board meeting and a MPC meeting,
with learning both in the board and in the policy meeting.26 The results are
calculated under the assumption that decisional competence of committee
members is equal on average (by way of illustration set at 0.6). Furthermore,
we retain the earlier assumptions regarding the size of the board (m = 6)27
and the threshold for the board to take a common position (kb = 4). In the
case when an informal board meeting takes place, members can either follow
the majority position of the board, if it exists, (INT ) or vote individually
25In both cases the learning rate of interacting members equals unity (for all committee
members or just for board members, respectively).
26In this case the learning rate is heterogeneous among committee members: λB = 1
and λNB = mn < 1.
27This assumption implies that n∗ ≥ 7.
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(IND).
MPC only Board+MPC, learning only in Board
(δB, δNB)28 (IND, IND) (IND, IND) (INT, IND)
α β (n∗, T ∗) Π− C (n∗, T ∗) Π− C (n∗, T ∗) Π− C
0.001
0.05
0.25
(27, 0.50)
(57, 0.09)
0.94
0.89
(7, 1.23)
(75, 0)
0.89
0.89
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.85
0.64
0.002
0.05
0.25
(17, 0.67)
(35, 0.17)
0.92
0.85
(7, 1.23)
(51, 0)
0.88
0.82
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.85
0.63
0.003
0.05
0.25
(13, 0.79)
(27, 0.21)
0.90
0.82
(7, 1.23)
(37, 0)
0.87
0.78
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.84
0.62
0.004
0.05
0.25
(11, 0.88)
(21, 0.25)
0.89
0.80
(7, 1.23)
(29, 0)
0.87
0.75
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.83
0.62
0.005
0.05
0.25
(9, 0.95)
(19, 0.27)
0.88
0.78
(7, 1.23)
(23, 0)
0.86
0.72
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.83
0.61
Board+MPC, learning in Board+ in MPC
(δB, δNB) (IND, IND) (INT, IND) (INT, INT )
α β (n∗, T ∗) Π− C (n∗, T ∗) Π− C (n∗, T ∗) Π− C
0.001
0.05
0.25
(7, 0.81)
(75, 0)
0.93
0.89
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.85
0.64
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.85
0.64
0.002
0.05
0.25
(7, 0.81)
(7, 0.37)
0.92
0.81
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.85
0.63
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.85
0.63
0.003
0.05
0.25
(7, 0.81)
(7, 0.37)
0.92
0.80
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.84
0.62
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.84
0.62
0.004
0.05
0.25
(7, 0.81)
(7, 0.37)
0.91
0.80
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.83
0.62
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.83
0.62
0.005
0.05
0.25
(7, 0.81)
(7, 0.37)
0.90
0.79
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.83
0.61
(7, 1.61)
(7, 0.57)
0.83
0.61
A prior informal meeting of board members creates an informational advan-
tage for them: they exchange their views and improve their competence.
This advantage is fully exploited in the optimum, and as a result almost in-
evitably the committee size is reduced to a minimum of 7 members (a board-
dominated committee), unless learning is expensive. Moreover, the highest
net benefit (the highest collective outcome) is reached assuming members
base their vote on their own views, ie independent voting.
The informational advantage obviously disappears if there is no informal
meeting. In this case, the optimal solution for the committee size is interior,
28δB and δNB denote the strategy choices of board and non-board members, respectively
(i.e. to vote independently or to take over the view of other members).
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and much larger. Furthermore, compared to the best possible collective out-
come to be reached in a set-up including a prior informal meeting (attained
under independent voting), the net benefit is only marginally larger,29 and
the optimal amount of time necessary for carrying out discussions is smaller.
The latter results are due to the fact that with a prior informal meeting the
total time spent on interaction by the board in a committee dominated by
the board is much larger: not only is T ∗ larger, but the board eﬀectively
spends 2T ∗ interacting.
Even though interaction results in a large reduction in the optimal com-
mittee size, we still observe a trade-oﬀ between the optimal number of com-
mittee members and the optimal amount of learning time. For example we
observe the following cases of a trade-oﬀ: in a single policy meeting the same
net benefit of 0.89 is obtained for the solutions: (57, 0.09) and (11, 0.88), if
the board meets prior to the MPC then the solutions (7, 1.23) and (75, 0)
yield 0.89 in the case when the MPC meeting does not involve interaction,
and (75, 0) and (7, 0.81) yield 0.89/0.90 in the case when the policy meeting
does involve interaction. As a result a committee designer faces a certain de-
gree of flexibility between the number of committee members and the amount
of time they should be allotted to reach the most accurate decision.
6 Conclusions
Our results have interesting implications for actual monetary policy making,
when conducted in a committee. First of all, we show that what policy mak-
ers in real life indicate to be an important characteristic of monetary policy
committees, interaction, is beneficial for the quality of interest rate decisions,
since committee members learn from each other. Secondly, interactive com-
mittees do not necessarily imply that members forego their own opinion and
follow the majority. In other words: members discuss the decision but do
not necessarily convince each other of their views. We show that interaction
(i.e. improving one’s expertise) without interdependent voting (i.e. wasting
one’s expertise) is the best decision-making procedure, except under certain
restrictive conditions.
Another implication regards the committee design: our results suggest
that there exists a certain degree of flexibility between the decision time
and the number of decision-makers: (1) if decisions are to be reached very
quickly (learning time is costly), the committee should be large; (2) if there
is suﬃcient time to take the collective decision (time is relatively cheap), the
committee size can be reduced, provided that two conditions are fulfilled:
29Unless the cost per member becomes very high.
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all committee members are involved in an exchange of views and learn from
each other, and all committee members vote following their own judgement.
Under such circumstances both procedures will yield similar net benefits.
We would like to conclude by stating that, while the main motivation
of this research is based on real life, i.e. the ’hub-and-spokes’ monetary
policy committees of the US Federal Reserve and the ECB, our analysis is
highly stylized and contains some important caveats. This should be kept in
mind when interpreting our results. An example of such a caveat is that in
our simple setup the only value added the board can provide is in terms of
improving the quality of decision-making in the committee. This is clearly
a simplification of reality, where ’hub-and-spokes’ committees tend to be
motivated by other arguments, see Meade and Sheets (forthcoming). Other
important caveats include the single-shot nature of our analysis, which clearly
is at odds with the fact that monetary policy decisions are taken on a regular
basis, so that the intertemporal dimension may be relevant for the current
setting of interest rates. We plan to take up the latter issue in future research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix A.1. Proof to Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Interaction among committee members improves the quality
of the collective decision-making process.
Proof: The quality of the collective decision-making process is given by
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the conditional probability EP (B|b):
EP (B|b) =
mP
sb=0
Ã¡
m
sb
¢eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb n−mP
s=n+1
2
−sb
¡
n−m
s
¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s
!
= (1− eqB)m n−mP
s=n+1
2
¡
n−m
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¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s
+m (1− eqB)m−1 eqB n−mP
s=n+1
2
−1
¡
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s
¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s
+...
+meqm−1B (1− eqB) n−mP
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+eqmB n−mP
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2
−m
¡
n−m
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¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s
where eqB denotes the learned skills of board members, and eqNB the learned
skills of non-board committee members. Since
∂
∂q
¡
qx (1− q)m−x
¢
=
x− qm
q (1− q)q
x (1− q)m−x
x ≥ qm⇔ ∂
∂q
¡
qx (1− q)m−x
¢
≥ 0
x < qm⇔ ∂
∂q
¡
qx (1− q)m−x
¢
< 0
then an increase in eqB lowers (increases) eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb for low (high) values
of sb. The total eﬀect is positive, since: (1) eqB ≥ 0.5 and therefore eqxB ≥
(1− eqB)x for all x ≥ 0, and (2) the series n−mP
s=n+1
2
−x
¡
n−m
s
¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s
is longer (by x elements) than the series
n−mP
s=n+1
2
¡
n−m
s
¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s and
therefore the sum of the first is larger than the sum of the latter (all elements
in the series are positive). As a result
∂EP (B|b)
∂eqB > 0
The reasoning is analogous for the skills of the non-board members, since
EP (B|b) can be re-written as:
EP (B|b) =
n−mP
s=0
Ã¡
n−m
s
¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s mP
sb=
n+1
2
−s
¡
m
sb
¢eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb
!
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As a result
∂EP (B|b)
∂eqNB > 0
We define interaction as a process, which involves time and learning. There-
fore its eﬀect on the skills of committee members is given as:
∂eqi
∂T
= λi (qi − eqi)½ = 0 if eqi = qi> 0 if eqi < qi
¾
As a result interaction is always beneficial for the quality of the collective
decision. In the decision-making process involving only the MPC including
interaction, all members interact simultaneously and hence they all improve
their skills. In the set-up with both a prior informal board meeting and a
MPC meeting, the interaction and learning takes place once or twice. In
either case, however, the skills of interacting members increase. Higher skills
imply higher EP (B|b). Q.E.D.
8.2 Appendix A.2. Proof to Proposition 2
Proposition 2: In interactive committees interdependent voting behavior
is unlikely, provided that the members’ primary interest is in the accuracy
of the collective decision.
Proof: Obviously, interdependent voting can only occur in the set-up
with both a prior informal board meeting and a MPC meeting, as described
in section 3. In this case committee members have the choice to follow the
majority position of the board, if it exists, (INT ) or vote individually (IND);
the strategy space is therefore given by δ = {INT, IND}. The incentives of
committee members are by assumption related to the quality of the collective
decision-making process:
Ui:i∈N(δ) = Πi(δ) = EPδ(B|b)
Therefore the choice of strategy depends on the delivered decision quality.
Case 1. Learning in the informal board meeting only
In this case only board members face the choice between the two strate-
gies; other committee members do not have the opportunity to learn about
the existence or lack of the common position in the board and hence they
vote individually.
Individual voting of board members delivers the following utility:
ΠB(IND) =
mP
sb=0
Ã¡
m
sb
¢eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb n−mP
s=n+1
2
−sb
¡
n−m
s
¢
qsNB (1− qNB)
n−m−s
!
25
whereas voting interdependently:
ΠB(INT ) =
kb−1P
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where eqB = q− (q − qB) exp (−T ). The diﬀerence in utility levels is given by:
ΠB(IND)−ΠB(INT ) =
=
m−kbP
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The diﬀerence is indeterminate, as two eﬀects are at play: for higher sb (1) the
expression eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb increases, but (2) the sum n−12 −sbP
s=n+1
2
−m
¡
n−m
s
¢
qsNB (1− qNB)
n−m−s
decreases while the sum
n−1
2P
s=n−1
2
−sb
¡
n−m
s
¢
qsNB (1− qNB)
n−m−s increases. The
sign of the diﬀerence and therefore the choice of the optimal voting strategy
depends on which eﬀect dominates. Thus, it depends on the relation between
the levels of board members’ learned skills eqB and non-board members in-
herent skills qNB. Only if the learned skills of board members are suﬃciently
high relative to the inherent skills of other committee members,30 the first ef-
fect dominates and the diﬀerence is negative, suggesting that interdependent
voting is preferable. Otherwise, independent voting is superior,31 i.e.:
ΠB(IND) > ΠB(INT )⇔ eqB ≈ qNB ⇔ (q − qB) exp (−T ) ≈ (q − qNB)
⇔ (qB ≈ qNB ∩ T → 0) ∪ (qB ≈ qNB ≈ q)
ΠB(IND) < ΠB(INT )⇔ eqB >> qNB ⇔ (q − qNB) >> (q − qB) exp (−T )
⇔ (qB ≈ qNB ∩ T >> 0) ∪ ((q − qNB) >> (q − qB))
30This can be due to any of the following: an initial asymmetry in expertise or an
abundance of time for discussions.
31Here a special case is the situation, when interdependent voting is inferior under sym-
metric inherent skills and no learning, discussed earlier in the literature (see, for example,
Nitzan and Paroush, 1985, Ladha, 1992, or Ladha, 1995).
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Case 2. Learning in both the informal meeting and the policy
meeting
In this case all committee members may have to choose between voting
independently or interdependently. We will analyze the game backwards,
starting with the decision of non-board committee members. If board mem-
bers vote independently, non-board committee members vote independently
as well. If board members present a common position, non-board members
have the choice between obtaining the following utility levels:32
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and
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where eqB = q − (q − qB) exp (−T ) and eqNB = eeqB − ³eeqB − qNB´ exp ¡−mn T¢,eeqB = q − (q − qB) exp (−2T ).33
The diﬀerence in the utility levels is given by:
ΠNB(IND)−ΠNB(INT ) =
m−kbP
sb=0
¡
m
sb
¢eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb n−mP
s=n+1
2
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32This choice is meaningful only if the board does not dominate the committee, i.e. only
if n−m ≥ n+12 . Otherwise, the board’s common position determines the outcome of the
interest rate voting. As a result, in small committees, the payoﬀs of non-board committee
members are equal: Π(IND) = Π(INT ).
33The formulas for eqB and eqNB are written out here to keep in mind two important
facts: (1) board members have taken decision on their common position after learning
time T , and (2) non-board members make their strategic choice after time T ; however,
their level of skills converges to the skills of board members attained after time 2T (board
members continue to learn from one another in the second stage of the decision making
process).
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The diﬀerence is indeterminate since: (1) the sum
mP
sb=kb
¡
m
sb
¢eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb is
larger than
m−kbP
sb=0
¡
m
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¢eqsbB (1− eqB)m−sb for eqB > 0.5, but (2) the sum n−mP
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2
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is larger than
n−1
2
−mP
s=0
¡
n−m
s
¢eqsNB (1− eqNB)n−m−s. Again the sign of the diﬀer-
ence and therefore the choice of the optimal voting strategy depends on the
dominating eﬀect, i.e. on the relation between skill levels:
ΠNB(IND) > ΠNB(INT )⇔ eqB ≈ eqNB
⇔ (qB ≈ qNB ∩ T ≈ 0) ∪ (qB ≈ qNB ≈ q)
ΠNB(IND) < ΠNB(INT )⇔ eqB >> eqNB
⇔ ((q − qNB) >> (q − qB)) ∪
³
qB ≈ qNB ∩ T >> 0 ∩
m
n
→ 0
´
If ΠNB(IND) > ΠNB(INT ), that is if non-board members have no incen-
tives to forego their private expertise and to vote interdependently, then
board members face a similar choice to the one in the case with limited in-
teraction. Under the same conditions, which make non-board members vote
independently, board members will vote independently as well.
If non-board members are likely to choose to follow the common position
of the board, then the choice of board members becomes: obtain the decision
accuracy:
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Under conditions requiring non-board members to forego their own expertise,
board members will choose to vote interdependently as well, since then the
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diﬀerence:
ΠB(IND)−ΠB(INT ) =
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is likely to be negative.
We therefore conclude that interdependent voting requires the following
condition to be met: eqB >> eqNB. However, as we argue in the main text,
this is not likely to be the case in the real-life. Q.E.D.
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